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SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 CU-05 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SAM-01 OIC-04

DRC-01 /146 W

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7567

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4381

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 4968

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: CSCE: SEPTEMBER 13 NAC CONSULTATIONS

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

SUMMARY NAC MET SEPTEMBER 13, WITH SEVERAL CSCE DELEGATION HEADS PRESENT, FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION ON ELEMENTS THAT ALLIES WOULD REGARD AS ESSENTIAL TO SATISFACTORY CSCE OUTCOME. DISCUSSION FOCUSSED ON BASKET III ISSUES. FRENCH REP, SPEAKING FOR EC-9, SAID IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DEFINE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME FOR BASKET III UNTIL A FIRST READING OF ALL THE TEXTS ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA HAD BEEN COMPLETED. THIS INTIAL RUN-THROUGH WOULD CLEARLY SET OUT BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN POSITIONS. THERAFTER, ALLIES WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO PREPARE FOR FINAL BARGAINING. FRENCH EXPRESSED OPPOSTION TO ANY SUBSTANTIVE MODIFICATION OF WESTERN BASKET III PROPOSALS AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, FRENCH
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REP POINTED TO RECENT EC-9 PAPER WHICH LISTS BASKET III ISSUES WHICH THE NINE CONSIDER AS CENTRAL AND IMPLIED THIS WAS STEP DESIGNED TO MEET US SUGGESTION THAT ALLIES SHOULD REFINE THEIR THINKING ON BASKET III ESSENTIALS.

US, IN CONTRAST, OBSERVED THAT IF ALLIES OPEN NEGOTIATIONS FROM THEIR PRESENT MIXIMAL POSITIONS IN BASKET III, THIS COULD RESULT IN AN ACRIMONIOUS AND PARTLY PUBLIC DEBATE THAT WOULD STIFFEN POSITIONS ON BOTH SIDES AND CARRY SOME RISKS FOR DETENTE PROCESS MORE GENERALLY. US THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT ALLIED DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA DEVELOP MORE REALISTIC TEXTS ON KEY BASKET III ISSUES THAT WOULD BE SOMEWHAT CLOSER TO LIKELY FINAL OUTCOME THAN THOSE PRESENTLY ON THE TABLE. HOWEVER, MOST OTHER DELEGATIONS SUPPORTED POSITION OF NINE THAT IT WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE DESIRABLE TO SCALE DOWN SUBSTANCE OF ALLIED BASKET III TEXTS AT THIS TIME.

IN ADDITION TO BASKET III DISCUSSION, POLADS' CHAIRMAN GAVE ORAL SUMMARY OF CBM DISCUSSIONS. FRENCH TABLED LANGUAGE ON QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS PREVIOUSLY AGREED IN BONN GROUP. NAC SESSION OPENED WITH SHARP GREEK-TURKISH EXCHANGE ON CYPRUS. END USUMMARY.

1. DSYG PANSA OPENED COUNCIL DISCUSSION ON CSCE BY CITING THREE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY LUNS (USNATO 4882) WHICH HE HOPED WOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR A DISCUSSION WHICH WOULD FOCUS ON BROAD ISSUES RATHER THAN ON DETAIL.

2. GREEK GENEVA REP (VELISSAROPOULOS) INITTIATED BRIEF, SHARP EXCHANGE WITH TURKS OVER CYPRUS. GREEK REP WONDERED HOW THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CSCE COULD BE RETAINED AFTER THE "TERRIBLE SHOCK" OF THE INVASION OF CYPRUS REFLECTING THE "SOVEREIGN DISDAIN" WHICH THE TURKS HAVE FOR THE CONFERENCE. HE ASKED WHAT CREDIBILITY NEW INSTITUTIONS CAN HAVE WHEN THE OLD ONES HAVE NOT WORKED. SIMILARY, VELISSAROPOULOS QUESTIONED THE VALUE OF DRAWING-UP TEN PRINCIPLES GUIDING INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT WHEN THE TURKS HAD VIOLATED NEARLY ALL OF THEM IN CYPRUS. GREEK REP ALSO ASKED WHAT IMPACT THE "FRIGHTENING SHADOW" CAST ON THE CONFIDENTIAL

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CSCE BY THE TURKISH ACTION WOULD HAVE ON PUBLIC OPINION. CITING THE PLIGHT OF GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES AND THE TURKISH BOMBING OF CITIES AND CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, VELISSAROPOULOS ASKED THAT THESE FACTORS NOT BE PUT ASIDE ASTHE ALLIES DISCUSSED PRECEPTS FOR FUTURE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ALSO ASKED THAT THE ALLIES TAKE THE PLIGHT OF CYPRUS AND THE CYPRIOTS SERIOUSLY AND NOT SIT IDLY BY. THE GREEK REP FURTHER LAMENTED THE FACT THAT ALL ALLIED DIPLOMATIC RESOURCES HAD NOT BEEN USED TO FAVOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WERE CLOSE TO FRUITION BEFORE THE SECOND TURKISH INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS.

3. GIVEN THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS, VELISSAROPOULOS RESERVED GREECE'S RIGHT TO ACCEPT OR REJECT CSCE RESULTS AND TO JUDGE THEM IN THE LIGHT OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. SIMILARLY GREECE WOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT TO CHANGE TEXTS ARRIVED AT IN GENEVA

TO REFLECT THE EVENTUAL CYPRUS OUTCOME AND TO STRENGTHEN

GUARANTEES AGAINST A REPETITION OF EVENTS THERE. GREECE MUST INSIST ON A FAVORABLE CYPRUS OUTCOME AS A MINIMUM ESSENTIAL IF IT IS TO AGREE TO A FINAL CSCE DOCUMENT.

4. DSYG PANSA REJOINED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD AVOID A DISCUSSION OF CYPRUS IN THE CONTEXT OF CSCE CONSULTATIONS, SINCE TO DO SO WOULD BE INCONTRADICTION TO THE COUNCIL'S AGENDA. TURKISH PERMREP (ERALP) AGREED AND SUGGESTED THAT FURTHER RECRIMINATIONS WOULD BE "DISRUPTIVE". WHILE EXPRESSING UNDERSTANDING FOR THE " DELICATE" GREEK ATTITUDE, ERALP NOTED THAT GREECE CYPRIOT COUP. TURKISH CSCE REP (BENLER) CRITICIZED THE TONE OF THE GREEK DELEGATION'S REMARKS AND RECALLED HIS PERSONAL EXPERIENCES IN CYPRUS WHEN THE GREEKS HELD A DOMINANT POSITION IN THAT ISLAND. HE ADDED THAT THE ORIGINAL COUP HAD BEEN PERPETRATED BY THE GREEK MILITARY IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS. HE ADDED THAT ANKARA WANTED A CYPRUS IN WHICH EVERYONE COULD LIVE TOGETHER ON AN EQUAL AND HARMONIOUS FOOTING.

5. COUNCIL DEAN DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) SECONDED PANSA'S APPEAL FOR OBSERVANCE OF THE COUNCIL RULES AND INVITED DELEGATIONS TO FOLLOW THE ANNOUNCED AGENDA RATHER THAN UNDERTAKE A DEBATE ON CYPRUS WHICH SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR OTHER FORUMS. FOLLOWING A GREEK ASSERTION THAT A CYPRUS DEBATE WOULD BE ENTIRELY RELEVANT TO A DISCUSSION OF CSCE, DE STAERCKE THREATENED TO LEAVE THE COUNCIL, CONFIDENTIAL

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THUS PROMPTING A RETURN TO SOLE DISCUSSION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

6. IN PRESENTING THE EC-9 PAPER ON CSCE (GENEVA 5721), FRENCH CSCE REP ANDREANI DESCRIBED THE NACCONSULTATIONS AS AN EXTREMELY VALUABLE PRELUDE TO RESUMPTION OF DISCUSSION IN GENEVA. HE ADDED THAT THE FIFTEEN AGREE ON FAR MORE THAN THEY DISAGREE ON. ANDREANI SAID THE MAIN OBJECTIVES IDENTIFIED IN THE EC-9 PAPER POINTED UP SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE ALLIES THAT: (1) WE SHOULD AVOID MERE CONFIRMATION OF STATUS QUO IN EUROPE; (2) A SERIOUS ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO EXPAND COOPERATION AND HUMAN FREEDOM; (3) THE CSCE SHOULD BE PURSUED NOT IN A VEIN OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION BUT OF COOPERATION; AND (4) THE CONFERENCE NOT END IN CAPITULATION BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER BUT IN COMPROMISE.

ANDREANI THOUGHT THE ALLIES ALSO AGREED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE TO COME UP WITH A HURRIED COMPROMISE THAT WOULD PERHAPS SERVE TO CONCLUDE THE CONFERENCE BUT ONLY BY JEOPARDIZING WESTERN INTERESTS. WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WILL NEED TO SEE SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT ON REASONABLE PROPOSALS IN BASKET III, AND TIME MIGHT WELL BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO ACCOMMODATE TO THIS REQUIREMENT WITHOUT EMBARRASSMENT TO THEMSELVES. ANDREANI OBSERVED THAT THERE WAS NO ACCURATE WAY PRESENTLY TO JUDGE THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION. HE ARGUED THEREFORE AGAINST OPENING THE BARGAINING BY LIMITING OR ABANDONING SOME WESTERN PROPOSALS WHEN THESE MIGHT IN FACT PROVE

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FM USMISSION NATO

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ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS IF THE ALLIES ARE PATIENT. AS AN EXAMPLE, ANDREANI NOTED RECENT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF A COMPROMISE ON ACCESS TO FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS AFTER THE ALLIES HAD MAINTAINED FIRM POSITIONS ON THIS ISSUE. HE HOPED THAT SIMILAR SOVIET CONCESSIONS WOULD RESULT IF THE ALLIES WENT THROUGH ALL OF THE OTHER ITEMS IN THE BASKET III MANDATE.

7. ANDREANI SAID CONSIDERATION OF HOW TO PREPARE AN EVENTUAL FINAL COMPROMISE WAS ONE OF THE MAIN QUESTIONS BEFORE THE ALLIES. TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION IT WAS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP A PROPER POINT OF DEPARTURE AND THIS COULD ONLY BE REACHED WHEN TEXTS ON ALL CSCE ELEMENTS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. ALTHOUGH THE ALLIES HAVE A GENERAL IDEA OF WHAT FINAL AGREED LANGUAGE WILL LOOK LIKE IN BASKETS I AND II, REAL PROBLEMS REMAIN IN BASKET III WHERE DRAFTING
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WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE ON ALL OF THE POINTS TO BE COVERED. AN INITIAL READING OF ALL THE TEXTS IN BASKET III IS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO REDUCE DIFFERENCES AND TO BRING THE OUTLINES OF AN EVENTUAL COMPROMISE INTO SHARPER FOCUS. ONLY AFTER FURTHER DRAFTING HAS BEEN COMPLETED ON ALL POINTS CAN KEY ELEMENTS BE IDENTIFIED FOR FURTHER BARGAINING. THE NINE AGREED THAT FLEXIBLE PROCEDURES WOULD BE NEEDED TO EXPEDITE THE EFFORT. THROUGHOUT THE NEXT PHASE, THE ALLIES MUST AVOID ANY PRESSURE TO LEAVE ISSUES UNRESOLVED FOR

FURTHER WORK IN A CSCE FOLLOW-UP ORGANIZATION.

8. IN PREPARING FOR FURTHER DRAFTING IN BASKET III, THE NINE WERE PREPARED TO REGARD SUCH ITEMS AS YOUTH EXCHANGES, TOURISM AND OTHER PARTS OF THE HELSINKI MANDATE AS SECONDARY ISSUES.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THEY SHOULD BE ABANDONED BUT RATHER DEALT WITH AS LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE MORE CENTRAL ISSUES.

9. ANDREANI AGREED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO DEFINE MINIMUM WESTERN REQUIREMENTS WAS TO BEGIN DRAFTING TEXTS BUT HE NOTED THAT TEXTS ALREADY EXIST, AND SUGGESTED THAT THESE BE REVISED AS THE CONFERENCE MOVES FORWARD. HE NOTED THE FOUR U.S. TEXTS IN BASKET III AND SUGGESTED THAT, ALTHOUGH THESE HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL BY THE NINE, THEY WOULD PROVE HELPFUL IN INDICATING POSSIBLE FINAL POSITIONS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. PROPOSALS WENT FARTHER TOWARD COMPROMISE THAN PREVIOUS TEXTS HAD GONE AND THAT A FINAL COMPROMISE MIGHT BE "STRONGER" THAN THE CURRENT U.S. FORMULATIONS. RATHER THAN DRAFTING COMPROMISE TEXTS NOW, ANDREANI SAID THE NINE PREFER TO DEFINE THE MAIN QUESTIONS IN EACH SUB-COMMITTEE. ANDREANI REITERATED OF THE NEED FOR A DISCUSSION OF ALL ELEMENTS SO THAT DIFFERENCES IN POSITIONS COULD BE PRECISELY IDENTIFIED. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF THE SOVIETS DID NOT GET THE IMPRESSION THAT PREMATURE BARGAINS COULD BE STRUCK WHICH WOULD LEAD TO GREATER WESTERN CONCESSIONS. IN CLOSING, ANDREANI ASKED IF THE ALLIES AGREED THAT: (1) THE ESSENTIAL TASK NOW WAS TO PREPARE FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON FINAL POINTS WHICH WOULD NOT PREJUDICE WESTERN INTERESTS, AND (2) IF THIS WOULD BE BEST ACCOMPLISHED BY INSISTING ON A COMPLETE ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS ON BASKET III.

10. AMB SHERER (U.S.) FOLLOWED ANDREANI'S REMARKS (FULL TEXT SEPTEL).
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1. UK PERMREP (PECK) SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE NINE AND THE FIFTEEN. HE BELIEVED THAT DELAYS IN CSCE WERE BASICALLY DUE TO EASTERN INTRANSIGENCE AND THAT THIS COULD ONLY BE OVERCOME IF THE ALLIES MAINTAINED THE INITIATIVE. HE DOUBTED WISDOM OF US PROPOSAL (ADVANCED BY AMB SHERER) THAT WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA SHOULD DRAFT NEW AND LESS AMBITIOUS BASKET III PROPOSALS THAN THOSE PRESENTLY ON TABLE. HE ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER NAC WAS BEST PLACE TO REVIEW ANY NEW BASKET III TEXTS; THIS WAS BETTER LEFT TO NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA. HE CALLED FOR ALLIED REALISM IN ASSESSING THE EASTERN POSITION BUT FOR COMPROMISE IF THE OTHER SIDE WERE ALSO WILLING TO BE FLEXIBLE. PECK OBSERVED THAT, IF THE SOVIETS REALLY WANT A WIDER DETENTE, AS DOES THE WEST, THEY WILL NOT ABANDON IT LIGHTLY. WITH REGARD TO TERMINATION DATES FOR STAGE II, PECK SAID THE END OF 1974 SEEMED A PROPER TARGET DATE BUT A FINAL DECISION SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR LATTER.

12. MEVIK (NORWAY) SAID THAT GENEVA HAD SHOWN THAT WESTERN POSITIONS COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVELY NEGOTIATED ON THE BASIS OF PREVIOUSLY AGREED PROPOSALS. THIS WAS IMPORTANT TO RECALL AS THE FINAL CRUCIAL CSCE PHASE BEGAN. HE SAID NORWAY HAD ALWAYS FAVORED A REALISTIC APPROACH TO BASKET III AND AGREED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE BEST INTEREST TO LET THE CONFERENCE DRAG ON UNDULY. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS WERE TOUGH NEGOTIATING PARTNERS AND THAT TACTICS SHOULD BE AVOIDED WHICH WOULD GIVE THEM THE HOPE OF ACHIEVING FURTHER EASTERN CONCESSIONS WITHOUT ANY COMPROMISE IN THEIR OWN POSITIONS. IT WOULD THUS PERHAPS BE UNWISE TO MAKE NEW PROPOSALS BEFOREGOING THROUGH ELEMENTS IN BASKET III SO THAT A FINAL COMPROMISE POSITION COULD BE MORE READILY DEFINED. MEVIK WELCOMED THE NINE'S INITIATIVE ON BASKET III, AND SAID HIS WOULD HELP THE WEST MAINTAIN MOMENTUM IN GENEVA. NORWAY HOPED TO SEE STAGE II CONCLUDE AS SOON POSSIBLE, AND THE TIME MAY HAVE COME TO AGREE "STRICTLY FOR INTERNAL PURPOSES" ON THE HYPOTHESIS THAT STAGE II COULD BE CONCLUDED THIS YEAR. IN THIS FINAL PHASE, NORWAY HAS NO EXPECTATION OF EARLY SOVIET CONCESSIONS OR OF MAJOR SHORT-TERM RESULTS. LIBERALIZATION IN EASTERN COUNTRIES IS ONLY POSSIBLE OVER THE LONG TERM.

13. WITH REGARD TO THE EC'S DEFINITION OF ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES IN BASKET III, NORWAY AGREED WITH THE NINE THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT
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EXPECT TO OBTAIN ALL OF ITS REQUIREMENTS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL, HOWEVER, TO OBTAIN SOME CONCRETE RESULTS AS LEVERS FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE LIBERALIZATION. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT SUCH ISSUES CONTINUE TO BE CONSIDERED AS PROPER FOR NEGOTIATION AMONG STATES.

14. DE STAERCKE SAID BELGIUM AGREED FULLY WITH THE POSITION OF THE NINE AS PRESENTED BY ANDREANI. HE EMPHASIZED THAT A FIRST READING ON ALL BASKET III TEXTS WAS ESSENTIAL. BELGIUM FULLY AGREED THERE WAS A NEED TO PREPARE FOR FINAL POSITIONS, BUT THESE SHOULD NOT BE THE SUBJECT OF BARGAINING BEFORE A FULL READING OF BASKET III ELEMENTS.

15. SVART (DENMARK) SAID SOVIET NEGOTIATING TACTICS MAKE IT RISKY TO DEFINE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS TOO PRECISELY AT THE PRESENT TIME.

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SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 CU-05 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SAM-01 OIC-04

DRC-01 /146 W

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R 132230Z SEP 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7569

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4383

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18. SHENSTONE ARGUED AGAINST GIVING THE SOVIETS A MINIMUM WESTERN POSITION NOW. CANADA SAW THE PROPOSALS OF THE NINE AS A PARTIAL AND REALISTIC APPROACH TO NEXT STEPS IN CSCE AND WELCOMED INITIATIVES TO ACCELERATE NEGOTIATIONS. HE HOPED THAT A FURTHER REVIEW OF POSITIONS IN BASKET III WOULD TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE PROPOSALS OF OTHERS, PARTICULARLY THOSE INTRODUCED BY THE U.S. IN JULY. ON THE QUESTION OF A CLOSING DATE FOR STAGE II, AND SPEAKING ON A PERSONAL BASIS, SHENSTONE OBSERVED THAT THE END OF 1974 DID NOT APPEAR REALISTIC. NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT WELL GO ON INTO THE NEW YEAR BUT THIS SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE AS LONG AS SOME PROGRESS IS BEING MADE.

19. BENLER (TURKEY) AGREED WITH THE IMPORTANCE PLACED BY THE U.S. ON ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS AND WITH ANDREANI THAT A FAVORABLE FINAL CSCE OUTCOME WOULD BE BEST PREPARED BY INSISTING ON A COMPLETE FIRST ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS ON BASKET III.

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20. VAN DER VALK (NETHERLANDS) NOTED A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE ALLIES AND PRAISED THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AMONG THE FIFTEEN IN GENEVA. HE AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD KEEP ABREAST OF CSCE DEVELOPMENTS SO THAT DIFFERENCES COULD BE RECONCILED THROUGH CONSULTATION. REFERRING TO THE U.S. HOPE TO AVOID DAMAGE TO DETENTE BY AVOIDING ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE IN GENEVA, THE DUTCH REP SUGGESTED THAT DETENTE WAS NOT A STATIC OR DEFINABLE THING BUT RATHER A STATE WHERE "QUALITY" IS IMPORTANT. VIEWS ON THE "QUALITY" OF DETENTE CAN VARY AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME AND IT WAS THEREFORE UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEANS MIGHT HAVE DIFFERING VIEWS GIVEN GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES. THE DUTCH AGREED THAT MOVEMENT IN BASKET III WAS ESSENTIAL AND THAT THE POSITION OF THE NINE SEEMED BEST DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE WESTERN OBJECTIVES.

21. FRG REP (BRUNNER) SAID BONN THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WOULD

PURSUE THE OBJECTIVE OF AN EARLY CSCE CONCLUSION AND MIGHT THEREFORE SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY. THE WEST MIGHT WELL ANTICIPATE, HOWEVER, A SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN STRESSING THE PRINCIPLES IN BASKET I AS THE CONFERENCE'S MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT. BRUNNER ALSO NOTED THAT THE QUESTION OF CONFERENCE FOLLOW-UP WAS ONLY A SLEEPING DOG AND THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH IT WHEN IT REVIVES. TACTICALLY, THE SOVITES SEEM TO SENSE THAT THE CSCE IS IN ITS FINAL ROUND AND MAY THEREFORE WANT TO OPEN FINAL BARGAINING BY BRACKETING SOME PREVIOUSLY AGREED LANGUAGE FOR TRADING PURPOSES. THIS TACTIC SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED SINCE IT WOULD ONLY SLOW MATTERS DOWN.

22. CATALANO (ITALY) PRAISED THE NAC CONSULTATIONS AND AGREED WITH ANDREANI THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WOULD REQUIRE A COMPLETE READING OF BASKET III TEXTS BEFORE FINAL NEGOTIATING BEGAN. CATALANO ASKED THAT IN DEVELOPING FINAL POSITIONS THE VIEWS OF THE NEUTRALS BE KEPT IN MIND.

23. IN SEEKING A CLARIFICATION OF THE EC POSITION, SHERER ASKED WHETHER THE EC INSISTENCE ON A FULL FIRST READING OF BASKET III ELEMENTS WAS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH GOING AHEAD WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WESTERN TEXTS ON BASIC BASKET III ISSUES.

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24. ANDREANI REPLIED THAT THE NINE WANTED NO COMPROMISE ON ESSENTIAL POINTS BEFORE A FIRST READING OF ALL BASKET III ELEMENTS. DURING THIS INITIAL REVIEW OF BASKET III, NO MAIN POINTS SHOULD BE SACRIFICED SO THAT KEY ELEMENTS COULD BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AT THE CLOSE OF THE INITIAL DISCUSSION. TO HELP THIS PROCESS ALONG, THE NINE HAD DECIDED TO TABLE NEW TEXTS ON THOSE BASKET III ISSUES WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN DISCUSSED. THESE TEXTS WOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS. THESE DRAFTS, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT INVOLVE ANY UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS AT THIS POINT. THEY WOULD REPRESENT SHORTER AND SIMPLER TEXTS, ELIMINATING OTHER SUPERFLUOUS LANGUAGE.

25. IN HIS CONCLUDING SUMMARY, PANSA SUGGESTED THAT UNITY IN ALLIED POSITION REFERRED TO BY AMBASSADOR SHERER WOULD HELP IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. HE NOTED AGREEMENT THAT ALL WOULD LIKE TO SEE WORK IN GENEVA PURSUED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AND THAT THE PROPOSALS MADE IN BASKET III BY THE NINE AND THE U.S. WOULD BE HELPFUL TOWARD THIS END. WHILE NOTING A DIFFERENCE OF APPROACH ON BASKET III, SUCH DIVERGENCES COULD BE DISCUSSED USEFULLY IN GENEVA AND IN THE COUNCIL WHERE GENERAL GUIDANCE RATHER THAN DETAILED TEXTS WOULD BE CONSIDERED.

26. PANSA BELIEVED THAT A MAJORITY FAVORED A FULL READING OF BASKET III, AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE APPROACHED WITH FLEXIBILITY SO THAT ESSENTIAL POINTS COULD BE IDENTIFIED. PANSA NOTED THAT A FINAL DATE FOR CONCLUSION OF STAGE II WAS STILL AN

OPEN QUESTION WHICH SHOULD NOT BE AGREED IN ADVANCE BUT
RESERVED FOR LATER DISCUSSION.

27. FOLLOWING PANSAS SUMMARY, ANDREANI PROVIDED THE TEXT ON
FOUR-POWER RIGHTS TO BE INCLUDED IN PRINCIPLE 10 (BONN 12710).
IN HIS PRESENTATION, ANDREANI RECALLED THAT THE ALLIES HAD ALWAYS
AGREED THAT CSCE SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A SUBSTITUTE GERMAN
PEACE TREATY AND THAT THE PRINCIPLES DECLARATION SHOULD NOT APPEAR
TO UNDERMINE FOUR POWER RIGHTS. ANDREANI SUGGESTED THAT IF
THERE WAS OBJECTION TO PLACEMENT OF THIS LANGUAGE IN THE 10 TH
PRINCIPLE IT COULD BE INCORPORATED ELSEWHERE AS A SEPARATE
PARAGRAPH.

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28. SHENSTONE (CANDAA) SAID CANADA WOULD STUDY THE TEXT CAREFULLY
AND WAS AWARE OF THE REASONS FOR SEEKING ITS INCLUSION. HE NOTED,
HOWEVER, THAT THE FINAL DOCUMENT SHOULD NOT "CONFIRM OTHER PEOPLE'S
DOCTRINES." TEXT ON FOUR POWER RIGHTS, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE
THOROUGHLY REVIEWED BY LEGAL EXPERTS IN GENEVA.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 SEP 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO04968
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740988/abbryxdc.tel
Line Count: 457
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <20 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE: SEPTEMBER 13 NAC CONSULTATIONS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
To: STATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
BERLIN
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SALT TWO GENEVA
MOSCOW
NICOSIA
MBFR VIENNA

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005